民眾黨會不會取代國民黨？

自由廣場》（金恆煒專欄）民眾黨會不會取代國民黨？ 2021/12/02 05:30 民眾黨會不會吃掉國民黨而成全國第二大黨？這是許多人關注的焦點。 先從一則小新聞說起，曾披掛民眾黨選立委的黨代表朱哲成，日前宣佈「退出民眾黨」，原因是「黨內充斥著一堆老藍男、政二代」，「現在充滿了謝立功、充滿了黃文財、充滿了韓家軍，過去那些年本土派的人跑到哪裡去了？」出身民進黨改投民眾黨的朱哲成又退出民眾黨；這只是民眾黨變遷的小泡沫事件，可以看到柯文哲的變化。 謝立功原是韓國瑜人馬，柯文哲提拔為秘書長，不能說不是志在韓流。接下來愈發證實。另一位韓國瑜人馬黃文財也進入民眾黨黨部，據稱是借重黃在媒體上的經驗。朱哲成指控民眾黨充斥老藍男、韓家軍自是事實。 不只如此，柯文哲不斷向國民黨示好，到凱達格蘭夜訪羅智強，除了送「藍白拖」外，還上了羅智強的直播節目。羅是馬英九人馬，「藍白拖」當然是向國民黨支持者拋媚眼，表示民眾黨與國民黨是難兄難弟黨。 柯文哲與民進黨合作六年，靠民進黨選上市長，連任成功不久，雙方從盟友儼成敵國。拿到的綠票已到頂了；山不轉路轉，韓流熱潮過後，國民黨迅速消退，柯文哲逮到轉進的機會。要繼續壯大非鯨吞蠶食國民黨的藍票不可。討好韓流是最快速的終南捷徑。 柯文哲引老藍男成為高幹主流，目的是向藍色選民招手。要吸收藍票，就得更貼近統派意識形態。在全球民主國家「保台抗中」宣告下，柯文哲執意要辦與中國上海的「雙城論壇」，藉口是：「不要斷在我手裡」；贏得朱立倫讚揚。民眾黨發言人楊寶楨敢大喇喇說：「民進黨政客很怕統一後被清算」云云，注意，發言人嘢！重點不在「清算」，那是假議題，重點在附合中國的「統一」；民眾黨透過發言人把「統一」放在「時程表」上向藍民招手。柯文哲從綠到白到藍到偏紅，這是有跡可尋。 根據台灣民意基金會的民調，民眾黨與國民黨在支持度上力拼亞軍，互有上下，就情感溫度言，民眾黨勝過國民黨。民眾黨是新生政黨，國民黨是百年黨國；前者有無限上昇的可能，後者呈現自然落體的趨勢。民眾黨會不會吃掉國民黨？可能。 但還有一個有趣的現象。四個公投案中，民眾黨黨中央決定「兩好兩壞」，即「反萊豬」與「護藻礁」投下贊成，「重啟核四」與「公投綁大選」投反對票。根據報導，民眾黨在邀請黨員針對四項公投案投票結果，黨員以懸殊比例，反對「兩壞」，支持投贊成票。迫使黨中央急轉彎；「兩好」雖照舊，但「兩壞」轉彎成「兩隨意」。所有媒體咸認民眾黨「藍化」了。 這代表什麼意思？這就是民眾黨的「質變」。黨部高層充斥韓國瑜人馬，黨員部隊也被國民黨黨員攻克，這就是木馬屠城記的現代版本。民眾黨即使吃掉國民黨一躍而成第二大黨，但國民黨支持者大批湧入民眾黨，成為黨內大宗，那麼量變就成質變，根據黨章，黨主席由黨員直接投票產生；民眾黨一旦成為國民黨2.0，柯主席的寶座不見得坐得穩。到時候是民眾黨取代國民黨？還是國民黨吃掉民眾黨？且看下回分曉。  （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

黃偉哲是不是校園抓耙仔？

自由廣場》（金恒煒專欄）黃偉哲是不是校園抓耙仔？ 2021/11/25 05:30 台南市長黃偉哲是不是黨國時代的鷹犬「線民」？這是嚴肅的課題，當事人與民進黨必須嚴正看待，不要以為風波一過就能船過水無痕。民進黨通過「提名特別條例」，賦予黨主席大到匪夷所思的權力，集提名權於一身；六都直轄市現任市長尋求連任不必初選，形式上由主席徵召即完成。黃偉哲的現任優先碰到線民事件能不能過關？這不是黃偉哲一人的困局，也會成為民進黨的困局。 事發之後，黃偉哲的表現頗有令人置疑的地方。首先傳聞沸沸揚揚了一個多月，黃偉哲沒有任何自清聲明，卻在最敏感時候溜進醫院，完全不符「危機處理」原則，難怪有媒體暗指他是「病遁」。 其次，出院後黃偉哲強調「我不是（A143線民）」外，臉書上表白自己「向警察局報案」；也有媒體報導，黃第一時間用的字眼是「備案」。無論「報案」還是「備案」，都不是逕行提告。重點是黃偉哲「妨害名譽」之訴，在大法官釋憲後難以成立，以拖待變罷。 最離奇的是黃偉哲回答記者的訪問。首先認定促轉會資料來自情資機關，「覺得存疑」云云。這是斧底抽薪之計，就是徹底否定促轉會所開放的監控檔案為真，從而取消「A143」，那麼「黃偉哲就是A143」說自不能成立。然而前有黃國書案證明檔案不假，再說，促轉會的資料固來自情資機關，卻是數十年累積下的第一手如假包換的「秘密檔案」。 黃偉哲另一辯解更有趣，他說：三、四十年前學生沒權力，所以沒有出賣的權益。沈政男醫生與農推系的黃偉哲同住台大男十一舍的，雖然替黃喊冤，但指出兩點：「十一舍幾乎都是醫學院學生」，但也有少數其他院系生不知道「如何安插進來」，「安插」二字吃緊；沈政男說醫學生成立了沒有登記的「噬箘體」，「秘密集會」的開會通知竟落入教官手裡，教官且在開會時敲門入室。這表示確有爪耙仔嚴密監視他們、打他們報告。 校園「爪耙仔」有沒有權力？「爪耙仔」居體系中最低層次；連捷克總統哈維爾所說「無權者的權力」的邊都摸不著。且「沒有權力」並不代表沒有「出賣」；「出賣」是抓耙仔的「天職」。有的校園抓耙仔是有大大的權力，也有大大的利益，如馬英九、胡志強之流。影射黃偉哲是抓耙仔的許忠信，當年也住台大十一舍，也有調查局以每月五千元來收買他。依監控檔案，「A143」是「農推系」、屬「支津佈建」，「主動提供情報」、佈建對象之一是「偏激社團」，而「噬菌體」是「鼓吹民主改革與台灣獨立」，當然屬「偏激團體」。 以上所述不是故入人罪；只是表明黃偉哲的自辯之辭漏洞很多，很難取信於人。從「病遁」到「報案」到自白，明顯難以自圓其說。這個大問號一日不解，質疑就一日不能除，如果民進黨一直惦惦不作為，不拿出辦法釋選民之疑，二○二二黃偉哲台南市長連任就難難難！鐵贏市台南或有易幟的可能。這才是重點。 （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

賴士葆的性別歧視與邏輯謬誤

自由廣場》（金恆煒專欄）賴士葆的性別歧視與邏輯謬誤 2021/11/18 05:30 衛福部長陳時中去年六月十五日參加友人聚餐大口喝酒、大聲唱歌的影片外流，立委蔡易餘揭露來源指出是中國微博的假消息。值得觀察的是國民黨藉此大肆抨擊，遂引發國共聯手的質疑。不過立委賴士葆公開砲轟，詈東罵西，毫無營養；最有趣的是這句經典，他指稱在場有「飯局妹」：「頭髮這麼長應該就是飯局妹。」 說什麼話？這樣赤裸裸的性別歧視也敢宣之於口！本來集矢於陳時中的，全反射到自己身上，因為犯了大不韙；不只是歧視而已，更是愚蠢之至，完全秀出他低劣的本性；難怪引發排山倒海來的撻伐。賴士葆見勢頭不好，趕忙又祭出「謊」字訣，想用謊言掩蓋駟馬難追的那一言。老實說愈扯愈瞎，愈扯愈讓人看不起。 語言就是心智的反映：如果把「心」當成道德層面，賴士葆的性別歧視不引發公憤才怪；「智」就是知識層面，賴士葆顯露了自己思維訓練的貧乏，通不過邏輯ABC的考試，死當。在賴大委員的話語中，我們可以毫不懷疑的得出賴士葆的推理與結論：「飯局妹」等於「長髮妹」、「長髮妹」就是「飯局妹」。是不是賴士葆自己的「飯局」經驗？我們不敢妄斷，但可能性非常高。不然如何會有這個斷語？ 所有邏輯入門的書，比如殷海光的《邏輯新引》 ── 寫給初入門看的邏輯書， 開篇就指明：邏輯推論以推論法則為依據，不依靠經驗或事實，經驗與事實對於推論沒有絲毫幫助；推論時如果一味依賴經驗，不獨無助反而有害。無論是靠個人飯局的經驗或事實，賴士葆都患了推論的謬誤。我們不必列出推論形式，用賴士葆想當然爾就可以證成他的邏輯謬誤。賴士葆使用了錯誤的推論形式，簡單的例子：「和尚都是光頭，蔣介石是光頭，所以蔣介石是和尚。」推斷蔣介石是和尚的荒謬與推斷長髮妹是飯局妹一色，賴士葆犯了邏輯負面示例的第一課。 幫賴士葆上一門基礎的免費邏輯課，有點不值。重點是，為什麼一年前的影片會在此時流出，而且成為國民黨們抹黑的工具？解讀起來不難，那就是陳時中已成為國民黨最大且最難打敗的對手，無論台北或桃園，陳時中都是民進黨的王牌，也是國民黨／藍營的勁敵；抹黑要趁早，不然來不及了 唱卡拉OＫ、喝酒，甚至抽煙，都是個人嗜好，都在私領域之內，沒有私德的問題，又咬不出利益輸送或利益衝突問題：刻意把「長髮妹」栽贓成「飯局妹」，那頓餐會就被貶抑成道德問題，即使摧毀不了陳時中的光環，也足以折損其人格。這就是賴士葆們用口水說故事，移花接木抹黑他、迫他下台的原因。問題是台灣防堵武漢肺炎的成功已成為世界的典範，做為防疫總指揮官的陳時中已贏得台灣人的信心與信任。要憑空抹黑陳時中？門都沒有，徒顯自己之短。 （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

Failures led to PRC-linked unit at NTHU

Mon, Nov 15, 2021 page8 led to PRC-linked unit at NTHU By Chin Heng-wei 金恆煒 National Tsing Hua University (NTHU) is at it again. Last year, the university was at the center of a controversy after establishing the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, funded by PJ Asset Management Group. The on-campus academy was described by some as an “illegal rooftop addition” to Taiwan’s higher education. This time, there have been reports that a Chinese Communist Party-linked entity, the Cross-Strait Tsinghua Research Institute (清華海峽研究院), had been operating at the university since 2016. What efforts has the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) made on the issue? MAC Minister Chiu Tai-san (邱太三) told a question-and-answer session at the Legislative Yuan that the council in July received reports on the issue and informed the Ministry of Education in August. The problem is that had the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister newspaper) not uncovered the case earlier this month, the institute might still be open today. Surprisingly, it took nearly four months for the government to shut the institute. Did the council not see it as a matter of concern? Chiu also said that, based on “respect for academia,” the council “rarely” investigates whether educational institutions have been infiltrated by Beijing, so the institutions might become loopholes. His statement was also full of holes. Rarely? The council has probably never investigated whether there are any infiltrated institutions. Without investigation, how did Chiu come to the conclusion that such campuses might become loopholes? Clearly, the council was covering up its own incompetence and failure, and used “respect for academia” as an excuse. Has the council not noticed that the world’s democratic countries are busy eliminating Chinese academies in jurisdictions that have infiltrated their universities? As the US tries to kick out Chinese-run Confucius Institutes, Taiwan has established one center for Mandarin learning after another in the US. The world has sensed the seriousness of Chinese infiltration at universities, while Taiwan is still upholding the banner of “respect for academia.” Although the fire of communism has already broken out on campuses, the “firefighters” are still hesitant to go in and extinguish the flames. As for NTHU, by helping the institute establish itself on campus without asking for the education ministry’s approval, the school might have contravened the University Act (大學法) and the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例), and university officials could face a fine or imprisonment. However, the university is passing the buck and claims that the institute was formed by its alumni association, and its office was rented from the Tze-Chiang Foundation of Science and Technology. That is certainly a big lie. An investigation by the National Security Bureau found that the office on the fifth floor of NTHU’s Innovative Incubation Center was rented to the foundation by the university, which then rented it to the Cross-Strait Tsinghua Research Institute on its own accord. Although the foundation was responsible for renting it to the institute, the university might have been behind the decision to do so. The government should therefore at least show determination and expel the foundation from NTHU’s campus. Chin Heng-wei is a political commentator. Translated by Eddy Chang

清大引紅火燒台灣

自由廣場》（金恆煒專欄）清大引紅火燒台灣 2021/11/11 05:30 怎麼又是清華大學？上回沸沸揚揚的鬧出違章建築 「台北政經學院」案，現在又搞出中共組織「清華海峽研究院」公然駐進清大，從二○一六年開始近五年之久。 陸委會到底幹什麼吃的？主委邱太三在立院答詢表示，七月收到相關情資，八月發文給教育部。問題是，如果《自由時報》沒有報導，「清華海峽研究院」到現在都不會關門。從「情資」到被迫關門，竟然花了近四個月時間。陸委會還在悠哉游哉事不關己？ 其次，邱太三撇清說：「基於尊重學術，很少調查學術單位有無被滲透情形，也使學術單位變成可能的破口」云云。一句話破綻百出。什麼「很少」？根本就是「沒有」。既然沒有調查，如何得出「破口」的結論？拿「尊重學術」當藉口，只能掩飾陸委會的無能、無效。難道沒有看到全球民主國家忙著清除中國滲透在大學的種種名目的「研究院」？美國把「孔子學院」趕出去，到台灣成立「華語文學習中心」；世界各國家都察覺學術界被滲透的可怕，獨獨台灣祭出「尊重學術」！紅火都已經燒進大學校園中了，還怕滅火隊不尊重學術而不入校門？那些曾志朗們拉「學術自由」的虎皮當大旗，可以閉嘴了。 清大明幫暗助廈門「清華海峽研究院」設「新竹辦公室」，從未報請教育部核准，有違大學法之虞，更嚴重的是明顯觸犯〈兩岸條例〉，不但要罰鍰且有刑責。問題來了，清華大學推得一乾二淨，宣稱「清華海峽研究院」是「校友」所成立，由設在校園的「自強基金會」轉租給「海峽研究院」，不屬於清大，校方未曾知悉或參與其中的業務運作。當然是彌天大謊。調查結果出爐，原來「新竹辦公室」座落於清大育成大樓五樓，由「自強基金會」向清大租賃，然後轉租廈門「清華海峽研究院」，由基金會打點一切，清大自是主謀。 先談關鍵字眼「校友」。中國的「清華」與台灣的「清華」八竿子打不著；除了因襲「清華」二字外，兩國的「清華」如之何會「校友」來「校友」去？〈兩岸條例〉要嚴禁的就是以學術為名勾結中國的「清華現象」。 陳力俊在清大校長任內完全無視森嚴法律，透過所謂廈門「校友會」，率領清大一級主管訪廈門，目的在結合兩岸的「清華」以完成「實體機構」。最後格於台灣法令，功敗垂成；不得已下改由「北京清華」與「台北清華」校友接手，這就是「清華海峽研究院」源起。陳力俊打出的口號就是「兩岸清華一家親」，夠白了罷。清大完全依此藍圖走到今天，更何況清大教授楊梵孛等三位曾以「新竹辦公室」名義到中國「清華海峽研究院」考察，宛如「清華一家親 」的慶功宴。 陳力俊是知法犯法，應科以刑責。至於清大與中國聯手，為了遂其「兩岸清華一家親」的陽謀，委由「自強基金會」當白手套，公然租大樓然後暗渡陳倉給中國官方；清大出謀劃策，豈容置身事外。罰五十萬？不過民脂民膏，無傷，至少「自強基金會」必須逐出校園，以示政府的決斷；剩下的就靠立委補破網了。 （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

批朱立倫「主謀變把風」 蘇貞昌：踩到痛腳 他哇哇叫是「正常倫」

批朱立倫「主謀變把風」 蘇貞昌：踩到痛腳 他哇哇叫是「正常倫」 蘇貞昌表示，現在看到自己的黨籍縣市長紛紛出來表態反對，他反而縮回去了，說他只是幫忙，本來是主謀，現在變成把風的幫忙，所以這個形容再貼切不過，比起朱立倫常常講話跟以前不一樣、反常，那還好得很。

No easy fix for recall procedure

No easy fix for recall procedure By Chin Heng-wei 金恒煒 The recall of former Taiwan Statebuilding Party legislator Chen Po-wei (陳柏惟) — the party’s only member of the Legislative Yuan — in Taichung’s second electoral district has raised questions about whether the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act (公職人員選舉罷免法) needs to be amended again. The most high-level advocate of this idea is former Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator Lin Cho-shui (林濁水). Lin believes that Chen’s recall was the direct result of the rush in 2016 to amend the original version of the act. The DPP at the time supported the amendment, which lowered the requirements for a recall. Lin says that the act needs to be amended again because its post-2016 version puts small political parties in jeopardy. However, the reason for amending the act in 2016 was simple: Following the 2014 Sunflower movement, seven then-legislators of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) — Tsai Chin-lung (蔡錦隆), Huang Chao-shun (黃昭順), Lin Kuo-cheng (林國正), Alex Tsai (蔡正元), Lin Hung-chih (林鴻池), Wu Yu-sheng (吳育昇) and Chiang Huei-chen (江惠貞) — were subjected to recall votes as part of the so-called “Appendectomy Project,” a pun based on the Chinese word for appendectomy’s likeness to “pan-blue legislator.” None of the recalls were successful, mainly because of the high threshold at the time. More than half of eligible voters had to ratify the proposal and at least half had to vote for the recall, as had been devised by the KMT. The two high thresholds were essentially a cast-iron guarantee that no recall vote would succeed. So, is the recall act in its post-2016 version the main culprit behind Chen’s defeat? To answer that, some additional cases must be analysed. Chen was recalled with 51.72 percent turnout and 51.48 percent of votes in favor of his recall, which means that both criteria of the pre-2016 version of the act would have been met. Even under the previous system with 50 percent thresholds, Chen would still have been recalled. Is the new system better than the old? Last year’s recall of then-Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) can serve as a counter example. In Han’s case, 939,090 voted in favor of recalling him, while 25,051 voted against, so that the votes in favor far outstripped those opposed to his ouster, and the recall was successful. However, because there was only a 42.14 percent voter turnout, falling short of the 50 percent needed before 2016, Han would not have been recalled under the old system. The question for Lin is if the DPP had not amended the law, would Han not still be Kaohsiung mayor? There is another case, which sits somewhere between Chen’s and Han’s, namely the attempted recall of former New Power Party legislator Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌). Huang’s recall vote was something of a trial run for the new, post-amendment version of the recall act. The result was that there were more votes in favor of his recall than against, but the turnout was less than one-quarter of eligible voters in his district, and the recall failed. In this case, it seems, the lower threshold did not sound the death knell of Huang, a legislator of a small party. If the reader will allow a small digression: Even though each name on the list of recall proposals as part of the Appendectomy Project escaped recall at the time, not one of them retained their seats: All among them who ran in the next legislative election got voted out. Huang Kuo-chang also did not run for re-election in his district and was placed fourth on the party’s legislator-at-large list, failing to win a seat. If these statistics do not entirely answer the question of the amended act’s political effect, they at least provide food for thought. Whether the threshold is high or low is no guarantee of the result. Can the DPP amend the recall act because of the result of Chen’s recall vote? Of course it can. Does the KMT have a say in this? No, it does not. The KMT, in its attempts to frustrate the rights of Taiwanese to recall public servants and elected officials, not only devised legislation that meant a successful recall was all but impossible, it also repeatedly revised legislation to block voters’ attempts to file recall petitions, the most egregious examples being the “[KMT Legislator] Wu Yu-sheng (吳育昇) clause” and the “Appendectomy Project clause.” Chen’s recall is certainly a setback, but the Taiwan Statebuilding Party might benefit from sympathy votes in the next election. The family of former KMT legislator Yen Kuan-hen (顏寬恆) might try to mobilize votes in Taichung’s second electoral district to get Yen, who last year lost his seat to Chen, back into power, but even that campaign will not stop Taiwan’s democracy from moving from strength to strength. Chin Heng-wei is a political commentator. Translated by Paul Cooper