）警方─檢方─法院已成為一條惡龍

自由廣場》（金恒煒專欄）警方─檢方─法院已成為一條惡龍 2021/09/23 05:30 賣成衣的朱學恒送喪禮花籃到衛福部疾管局、到駐德大使館，部長陳時中與大使謝志偉並沒有提告，警方、檢方也沒有任何行動；陳時中只說台灣是「法治國」，謝志偉則把所送花朵插到廁所，諷之為「垃圾回收」。與成衣商的喪禮花籃相比，喪葬業／卡拉OＫ朱姓商人僱喪葬團歡送警察局分局長，竟被拘提、被送辦、被羈押，兩朱的際遇天壤之別。朱姓成衣商與朱姓喪葬業者所作所為完全一致，為什麼後果天差地別？是法律出了問題還是司法出了問題？ 新竹縣警察局竹東分局局長江建忠調派宜蘭三星警分局，十五日下午縣民朱氏僱用送葬團的白色醒獅和佛祖車「歡送」、「祝賀」，據報導引發警界高層「震怒」，警方拘提朱男到案。十六日警政署長陳家欽到新竹先把朱男的行為定為「侮辱公署」，又將之與黑道掛在一起，表示：「對於不法分子挑戰公權力，絕對不會坐視不管，已指示刑事局追查揪出幕後指使者嚴辦。」 「侮辱公署」其實是「微罪」，不過「三千元以下罰金」而已，當然構不成「聲押」的要件，據報導，有法界人士認為這些人太囂張，已踩到司法機關的「紅線」，於是棄「侮辱公署罪」，改採有「串證之虞」的刑事訴訟法第一○一條聲押，最後法官竟率而裁准了。從拘提到聲押到獲准一氣呵成，老實說侵犯人權到無以復加的地步，警方到檢方到法院，非法濫權到絲絲入扣，一椿小小的案子大大暴露了台灣司法的黑暗。 警方拘提朱姓男子祭出的是所謂「侮辱公署罪」，這個法條藏在刑法一四一條「妨害公務」下的末尾，明顯有違憲之虞；如果堪用，朱成衣商早就法辦了。何況「公署」不是「官衙」，憲法保護言論自由，公民挑戰「公署」之權不容剝奪。美國歷史上有Sedition Act of 1918，明文禁止污辱憲法、三軍、聯邦、總統等，與台灣現在的「侮辱公署罪」無異，美國國會一九二○年廢除此條款。台灣殘留的此一戒嚴尾巴，難道國會還要坐視？ 陳家欽說「我們尊嚴掃地！」那麼法辦朱姓男子到底是為了「面子」還是「法律」？檢察官知道「侮辱公署罪」不符合羈押要件，臨時改換法條，動用「串供」的刑法，不啻是為羈押而羈押的故入人罪；濫用羈押手段等於顛覆無罪推論的帝王原則，那就是濫權。用羈押當手段壓迫被告，那是刑法學者林山田過去一再揭示的濫權擴張，不料復見於今日。重點是，羈押必須符合「合法的目的」，也必須符合「比例原則」。警方為了「面子」，非要繫朱於獄，安上「黑道」罪名形同「一清專案」故伎；太可恥了罷！那是黨國的心態復辟，民主的台灣能容許嗎？ 警方─檢方─法院已成為一條惡龍，吞噬無權無勢的小民，「是可忍也，孰不可忍」？ （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

趙少康討打

由廣場》（金恒煒專欄） 2021/09/16 05:30 中廣公司董事長、ＴＶＢＳ談話節目主持人趙少康大張旗鼓成立「戰鬥藍」，要進軍二○二二年選舉。咚咚戰鼓終於讓前澄社社長、前立委黃國昌看不下去，拋出「戰帖」挑戰，指控趙跨越了媒體與政治應有的紅線：「一位掌握媒體大權的第一線媒體人，能夠這樣毫無分際地發起政黨次團體、站在第一線領導政治攻防嗎？」 黃國昌措辭強悍，直攻核心，趙少康沒有絲毫閃避的空間，硬著頭皮逼得出面回應；可憐，荒腔走板到像不識之無的痴憨小兒。他的答辯有兩大重點，其一是說「現行〈廣電法〉只規定媒體人不能參加黨職、公職」云云。大錯特錯。〈廣電法〉管不到「媒體人」，自沒有任何「規定媒體人不能……」；〈廣電法〉的規範對象是「政府、政黨、其捐助成立之財團法人及其受託人」，趙少康紮了一個稻草人來當盾牌反問：「有規定媒體人不能有政治立場、不能有政治主張、不能參加政治活動嗎？」只透露自己缺乏起碼的法律ＡＢＣ知識。 趙少康的第二個答辯是，他「沒有黨職也沒有公職身份，且『戰鬥藍』也不是政治團體、政黨，為什麼要辭職？」此地含有三個問題，最關鍵的是「戰鬥藍」是不是政治團體？很容易反駁，你看到一隻鴨子，走起來像鴨子、叫起來像鴨子、吃起來像鴨子，那就是鴨子。趙少康號召從政黨員：「明年選舉只要喊『戰鬥藍』，就一定當選！」請問，「戰鬥藍」不是「政治團體」又是什麼東西！趙少康已回復黨籍，且「戰鬥藍」成員不是黨籍立委就是黨籍議員，幾乎沒有例外，「戰鬥藍」就是為選舉，全屬政黨活動，更何況請假中的黨主席江啟臣還花大錢替「戰鬥藍」做半版廣告。這不是黨務工作是什麼？ 〈廣電法〉第五條各項各款規定，趙少康幾乎無一不違犯；尤其禁止政黨、政黨黨務工作人員等「擔任廣播、電視事業之發起人、董事、監察人及經理人。」僅這一條，趙少康就非得辭中廣公司董事長不可，還需要黃國昌指點「為什麼要辭？」辭了中廣董事長只擔任ＴＶＢＳ談話節目，如果還利用媒體為「戰鬥藍」張目，這是藉媒體謀一己政治權力，對黨內或政黨間都有失「公平競爭」原則；〈廣電法〉固不及媒體人，但ＮＣＣ既能停「中天」，難道不能治ＴＶＢＳ？「中天」因韓國瑜而亡，ＴＶＢＳ要把生死押在趙少康身上？ 趙少康自己踩了紅線，還東拉西扯的說：「除了ＴＶＢＳ中立外，幾乎都成了親綠媒體」。ＴＶＢＳ「中立」嗎？這是簡單可以回答的問題。任何辯論一方，一旦祭出「中立」二字，其實就洩了自己的底。最好笑的是趙少康把「三民自」當成「三明治」來打，顯示這位媒體大亨只是生意人，不知道電視、廣播之所以有法律規範，是因為稀有性，不能挪用於平面媒體；把「三民」、「自」綁在一起，好像把油與酒混在同一瓶子一樣荒唐。 黃國昌要趙少康來一次面對面辯論，趙少康不敢接招，原因就那麼簡單。 （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

有了「戰鬥藍」還須要「黨中央」？

自由廣場》（金恒煒專欄）有了「戰鬥藍」還須要「黨中央」？ 2021/09/09 05:30 國民黨黨主席選舉，很冷；與韓國瑜叱吒一時的現象比較，落差未免太大。更值得關注的是，台上江啟臣、朱立倫、張亞中、卓伯源四人辯論，竟抵不過台下趙少康一人的吆喝；不是趙少康有多厲害，是「四人幫」氣息奄奄到瀕死狀態。 國民黨走到今天，真是途窮日暮，全黨沒有一個超人氣，候選人中沒有一個是行政首長，江啟臣是立委外，其他三人一介平民而已；江啟臣雖是國會議員，看來也不能號召黨籍立委。國民黨的運氣可能被韓國瑜梭哈完了，大賭一把下，輸光了國民黨的全部家當。落到今天地步，不知算不算老天有眼？還是台灣人民「贊」!? 趙少康原本要競逐黨主席，而且拿出韓國瑜的「令箭」，不料被黨中央堵截而功敗垂成。現在重新練兵，組成「戰鬥藍」，其一決藍天之氣勢，看來遠比台上四諸公強。那麼，趙少康到底要幹什麼？必有所圖是大家的共見，問題是，所為何事？ 媒體最先的報導是，趙少康要分裂黨、分裂藍營，自成新勢力。此推論來自趙少康有「分裂黨」的多次前科，第一次是在黨內搞「新國民黨連線」， 一九九三年成立新黨，角逐台北市長，與國民黨提名的黃大洲搶票不遂，新黨的風光很短時間就黯然收斂。趙少康對自己的歷史問題的回應是：李登輝要搞台獨，所以「分裂」有理。其實問題的關鍵在李登輝的高人氣下，只能選擇「離開」一途；盱衡實力，李登輝宛如大樹，要掰倒李主席是不可能的任務，只能落入「蚍蜉撼大樹」的慘境。這回成立「戰鬥藍」，強調不是分裂黨，而是「希望國民黨整個變成有機的戰鬥體」。這句話才是重點。 也有媒體說他要變成「地下黨主席」，問題是，有能力成為「地下黨主席」，早就下手了，要等到現在？何況能不能成為「地下」的權臣，像張居正一樣，也得看萬曆皇帝的能耐。但是，經過黨主席艱苦的選戰，好不容易取得黨主席權柄，臥榻之旁豈容他人酣睡？ 既不是「分裂」出去，又不能當「地下黨主席」，趙少康要幹什麼？能幹什麼？看他虎虎生風的南北奔波、串連，又是議員，又是立委，其實志在「另立黨中央」；這個黨中央不是制度性的，更像是吸星大法般吸納國民黨 / 藍營於「戰鬥藍」的有機體中，即使黨中央依然在，即使黨主席依然在，透過排擠效用，黨不免只剩空殼子。戰鬥藍的力道一旦壓過黨中央，趙少康就立地成王了。 看趙少康的號召就知道他的戰略，大言炎炎的說：「明年選舉只要喊『戰鬥藍』，就一定當選！」像不像中共文革的神話：「戰無不勝，攻無不克的毛澤東思想萬歲！萬歲！萬萬歲！」有了「戰鬥藍」神威的護體，誰須要黨中央!?何況「戰鬥藍」的象徵符號也設計好了，就是打上顯赫「戰鬥藍」標誌的口罩；這是制服，像中山裝一樣。 國民黨一邊是黨主席選舉，一邊是「戰鬥藍」開打，兩條路線，最後會不會綰結在一起？誰主浮沉？這是看點。 （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

KMT hopefuls’ focus on deep blue By Chin Heng-wei 金恒煒 Are the candidates in the upcoming Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairperson election simply vying for the party leadership or is it about preparing for the grand prize of the presidency in 2024? According to political logic and the rules of power play, the election for the top job in a political party is to muster the troops for major elections, with the objective of selecting the presidential candidate or primary political power brokers, thereby gaining control over the executive and legislative branches. The KMT has done away with the formula of 30 percent party member votes and 70 percent public opinion polls in the chairperson primary in favor of looking solely at opinion polls, so that it is best placed for gaining the ultimate prize in 2024. However, the two main candidates have clearly set their sights firmly and exclusively on the deep-blue vote within the party, and seem to be unconcerned about votes coming from anywhere else. One needs look no further than how they staged their official registration for the election. Former New Taipei City mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫) made sure he arrived at 10:10am on the dot, a clear reference to Oct. 10, Double Ten National Day, and was flanked by representatives of the Retrocession Alliance formed of members of the KMT’s deep-blue Huang Fu-hsing (黃復興) faction, including retired generals such as former army commander-in-chief Chen Chen-hsiang (陳鎮湘), Central Military Institute and Academy Alumni Association president Chi Lin-liang (季麟連) and Fu Hsing Kang Alumni Foundation president Lee Tien-tuo (李天鐸). Not to be outdone, KMT Chairman Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) amassed a veritable constellation of his own, as he was accompanied by representatives from the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy, the Political Warfare Cadres Academy, also known as Fu Hsing Kang College, and the National Defense Medical Center. Who exactly were these people? They are hardly household names. None has a sufficiently high national profile to attract votes, and therein lies the rub: The presence of these “heavyweights” will hold no sway beyond military dependents’ villages or the deep-blue vote. Thus, it revealed Chiang’s and Chu’s modest expectations: Their ambition stops at securing the KMT leadership. The party loves to dangle numbers before Taiwanese’s eyes, as evidenced in Chu’s reference to Double Ten National Day and the “seven major policy initiatives,” and Chu’s “five major goals” and “five major promises” if he wins re-election. Of course, there is also Chu’s “823 Artillery Bombardment,” which he claimed for the KMT, saying that it represented how the party defended Taiwan in 1958. He was simply repeating the KMT’s lie about the bombardment of Kinmen and Matsu, which was a farce contrived by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT. As former Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai (周恩來) told former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger: In 1958, then-US secretary of state John Foster Dulles wanted then-president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) to abandon Kinmen and Matsu to completely sever relations between Taiwan and China, but Chiang Kai-shek refused to do so, due in part to Zhou advising him not to withdraw his troops. The truth is that the bombardment was a sham, an act of cooperation between the CCP and the KMT. Zhou himself used the word “cooperation.” If this is the case, how can what happened be seen as the KMT defending Taiwan? Even more risible are Chu’s comments that not one person from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) spilled their blood in the defense of Taiwan. To this I would ask, has Broadcasting Corp of China chairman Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康) ever spilled one drop of his blood defending Taiwan, or spent a day in jail for his political convictions? Has Chu? Has Johnny Chiang? Who exactly is Johnny Chiang trying to kid with his new slogan: “the 1992 consensus based on the Republic of China Constitution”? He has proposed two versions of this slogan in Chinese, but however he phrases it, marrying the corpse that is the Constitution with the lie that is the “1992 consensus” simply does not get Taiwan very far. In February, just after he became KMT chairman, Johnny Chiang was fully prepared, without a second’s hesitation, to bid farewell to the “1992 consensus,” saying that it is outdated, lacks flexibility and is gradually losing the support of Taiwanese. He also said that he himself was a young man of only 20 years when the “consensus” was made, and that “irrespective of whatever ‘consensus’ the two sides of the Taiwan Strait arrived at back then, friends younger than myself need to feel that this ‘consensus’ in some way represents them.” Not even half a year later, with those words still ringing in people’s ears, he has retrieved the discarded concept from the trashcan of history and held it aloft as some kind of rediscovered treasure. The reason he has done so is simple: He wants to use its tarnished allure to secure the deep-blue vote; he wants his slice of former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) support. After all, as the appetite for the chairperson election has all but dissipated, he needs all the votes he can get, by hook or by crook. He might well find that his new slogan will come back and bite him in the behind. Truly, the two main KMT chairperson candidates have their mouths full of lies and heads full of cheese. Chin Heng-wei is a political commentator. Translated by Paul Cooper

KMT hopefuls’ focus on deep blue By Chin Heng-wei 金恒煒 Are the candidates in the upcoming Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairperson election simply vying for the party leadership or is it about preparing for the grand prize of the presidency in 2024? According to political logic and the rules of power play, the election for the top job in a political party is to muster the troops for major elections, with the objective of selecting the presidential candidate or primary political power brokers, thereby gaining control over the executive and legislative branches. The KMT has done away with the formula of 30 percent party member votes and 70 percent public opinion polls in the chairperson primary in favor of looking solely at opinion polls, so that it is best placed for gaining the ultimate prize in 2024. However, the two main candidates have clearly set their sights firmly and exclusively on the deep-blue vote within the party, and seem to be unconcerned about votes coming from anywhere else. One needs look no further than how they staged their official registration for the election. Former New Taipei City mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫) made sure he arrived at 10:10am on the dot, a clear reference to Oct. 10, Double Ten National Day, and was flanked by representatives of the Retrocession Alliance formed of members of the KMT’s deep-blue Huang Fu-hsing (黃復興) faction, including retired generals such as former army commander-in-chief Chen Chen-hsiang (陳鎮湘), Central Military Institute and Academy Alumni Association president Chi Lin-liang (季麟連) and Fu Hsing Kang Alumni Foundation president Lee Tien-tuo (李天鐸). Not to be outdone, KMT Chairman Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) amassed a veritable constellation of his own, as he was accompanied by representatives from the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy, the Political Warfare Cadres Academy, also known as Fu Hsing Kang College, and the National Defense Medical Center. Who exactly were these people? They are hardly household names. None has a sufficiently high national profile to attract votes, and therein lies the rub: The presence of these “heavyweights” will hold no sway beyond military dependents’ villages or the deep-blue vote. Thus, it revealed Chiang’s and Chu’s modest expectations: Their ambition stops at securing the KMT leadership. The party loves to dangle numbers before Taiwanese’s eyes, as evidenced in Chu’s reference to Double Ten National Day and the “seven major policy initiatives,” and Chu’s “five major goals” and “five major promises” if he wins re-election. Of course, there is also Chu’s “823 Artillery Bombardment,” which he claimed for the KMT, saying that it represented how the party defended Taiwan in 1958. He was simply repeating the KMT’s lie about the bombardment of Kinmen and Matsu, which was a farce contrived by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT. As former Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai (周恩來) told former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger: In 1958, then-US secretary of state John Foster Dulles wanted then-president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) to abandon Kinmen and Matsu to completely sever relations between Taiwan and China, but Chiang Kai-shek refused to do so, due in part to Zhou advising him not to withdraw his troops. The truth is that the bombardment was a sham, an act of cooperation between the CCP and the KMT. Zhou himself used the word “cooperation.” If this is the case, how can what happened be seen as the KMT defending Taiwan? Even more risible are Chu’s comments that not one person from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) spilled their blood in the defense of Taiwan. To this I would ask, has Broadcasting Corp of China chairman Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康) ever spilled one drop of his blood defending Taiwan, or spent a day in jail for his political convictions? Has Chu? Has Johnny Chiang? Who exactly is Johnny Chiang trying to kid with his new slogan: “the 1992 consensus based on the Republic of China Constitution”? He has proposed two versions of this slogan in Chinese, but however he phrases it, marrying the corpse that is the Constitution with the lie that is the “1992 consensus” simply does not get Taiwan very far. In February, just after he became KMT chairman, Johnny Chiang was fully prepared, without a second’s hesitation, to bid farewell to the “1992 consensus,” saying that it is outdated, lacks flexibility and is gradually losing the support of Taiwanese. He also said that he himself was a young man of only 20 years when the “consensus” was made, and that “irrespective of whatever ‘consensus’ the two sides of the Taiwan Strait arrived at back then, friends younger than myself need to feel that this ‘consensus’ in some way represents them.” Not even half a year later, with those words still ringing in people’s ears, he has retrieved the discarded concept from the trashcan of history and held it aloft as some kind of rediscovered treasure. The reason he has done so is simple: He wants to use its tarnished allure to secure the deep-blue vote; he wants his slice of former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) support. After all, as the appetite for the chairperson election has all but dissipated, he needs all the votes he can get, by hook or by crook. He might well find that his new slogan will come back and bite him in the behind. Truly, the two main KMT chairperson candidates have their mouths full of lies and heads full of cheese. Chin Heng-wei is a political commentator. Translated by Paul Cooper

國民黨的「高端」愛恨情意綜

自由廣場》（金恒煒專欄）國民黨的「高端」愛恨情意綜 2021/09/02 05:30 國民黨對國產疫苗「高端」有莫名的「愛恨情意綜」，最新的併發症莫過於黨主席候選人朱立倫了。朱立倫日前有三個提問：其一是質疑：「高端是民進黨的金孫嗎？」接著說：「蔡英文總統、前副總統陳建仁都變成高端大使」；質問二是：「高端只是剛好由台灣公司生產的疫苗，剛好由台灣政府倉促通過緊急使用權」云云；總結是「打高端不代表愛台灣！」其實朱立倫的論述抵不住他的愛恨情結，每一質問及斷語，都值得好好挖掘一下，才能把隱藏內心深處的焦慮挖將出來。 高端是不是民進黨的金孫？此問只透顯朱立倫的幼稚。舉一個實例以破其蔽。陳水扁總統執政時，全力支援高鐵工程，那時候馬英九嗤之以鼻不屑的斥之為「廢鐵」，後來奔波參選非搭高鐵不可。有一回被影星江霞逮住，當面向他吐槽：「廢鐵？你為什麼坐！」陳水扁早已卸任，高鐵依然是永遠的高鐵。昔日陳水扁的「金孫」，今天不是成為人人的金孫嗎？焉知民進黨的金孫不會成為台灣人的金孫？何況高端已進入國際認證的程序中，甚至有可能出現台灣版的「疫苗外交」。 高端是不是兩個「剛好」才成為民進黨成績？再用高鐵當例子。如果馬英九執政會不會啟動高鐵工程？如果腦中一味「廢鐵」心態，台灣怎可能會有高鐵？如果當初低貶高鐵只是酸葡萄，那也正好指涉朱立倫現在的阿Q心態。台灣之有高端，不是橫空出世，能取得美國國衛院「授權合約」，其實拜政府努力之賜。政府預先向高端及聯亞各預購五百萬劑，那是定心丸。朱立倫兩個「剛好」之後又補上「倉促」，愛恨交加，更不可掩。台灣投資疫苗，相較美國砸重金，小款代誌。美國前總統川普打出「曲速行動」（Operation Warp Speed），投下上百億美金，通過衛生與公共服務部、國防部合作，資助多家藥廠研發疫苖，才有今天的成效。 至於說總統以下都成為「高端大使」，又怎樣？有問題嗎？過去國民黨一黨執政時，震天價響的口號不是「愛用國貨」嗎？現在民進黨執政，一改嘴臉，諷刺為「國貨」宣傳！恨恨恨呀。不可笑嗎？ 打高端是不是代表愛台灣？朱立倫說不是。高端六輪的施打率八六․五三％，中央疫情指揮官陳時中說，比ＡＺ、莫德納疫苗報到率九成略低，但不算低太多。此結果自與藍營一再炒作的唱衰不符，或許這是使朱立倫做出此一斷語的原因。 然而且先看幾個反例，再回頭檢視朱立倫的說法。最典型的話出於連勝文之口：「請民進黨民代和側翼盡快打高端，實踐台灣價值。」言下是「高端＝台灣價值」。這種心態模式同時見於洪秀柱、郁慕明、邱毅、苑舉正等人的言行，他們都把「打中國疫苗」等同「愛中國」。那麼朱立倫反其道而言，說「打高端不代表台灣價值」，是不是否證了洪秀柱等「打中國疫苗」代表「愛中國」的宣告？還是洪秀柱們的邏輯打了朱立倫邏輯的臉？ 國民黨這種邏輯上的錯亂，其實不只在愛／恨高端上，而在愛／不愛中國以及愛／不愛台灣上。國民黨的路怎麼這麼難走？看他們對高端的愛恨情仇就知道了。 （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/

國民黨的「高端」愛恨情意綜

自由廣場》（金恒煒專欄）國民黨的「高端」愛恨情意綜 2021/09/02 05:30 國民黨對國產疫苗「高端」有莫名的「愛恨情意綜」，最新的併發症莫過於黨主席候選人朱立倫了。朱立倫日前有三個提問：其一是質疑：「高端是民進黨的金孫嗎？」接著說：「蔡英文總統、前副總統陳建仁都變成高端大使」；質問二是：「高端只是剛好由台灣公司生產的疫苗，剛好由台灣政府倉促通過緊急使用權」云云；總結是「打高端不代表愛台灣！」其實朱立倫的論述抵不住他的愛恨情結，每一質問及斷語，都值得好好挖掘一下，才能把隱藏內心深處的焦慮挖將出來。 高端是不是民進黨的金孫？此問只透顯朱立倫的幼稚。舉一個實例以破其蔽。陳水扁總統執政時，全力支援高鐵工程，那時候馬英九嗤之以鼻不屑的斥之為「廢鐵」，後來奔波參選非搭高鐵不可。有一回被影星江霞逮住，當面向他吐槽：「廢鐵？你為什麼坐！」陳水扁早已卸任，高鐵依然是永遠的高鐵。昔日陳水扁的「金孫」，今天不是成為人人的金孫嗎？焉知民進黨的金孫不會成為台灣人的金孫？何況高端已進入國際認證的程序中，甚至有可能出現台灣版的「疫苗外交」。 高端是不是兩個「剛好」才成為民進黨成績？再用高鐵當例子。如果馬英九執政會不會啟動高鐵工程？如果腦中一味「廢鐵」心態，台灣怎可能會有高鐵？如果當初低貶高鐵只是酸葡萄，那也正好指涉朱立倫現在的阿Q心態。台灣之有高端，不是橫空出世，能取得美國國衛院「授權合約」，其實拜政府努力之賜。政府預先向高端及聯亞各預購五百萬劑，那是定心丸。朱立倫兩個「剛好」之後又補上「倉促」，愛恨交加，更不可掩。台灣投資疫苗，相較美國砸重金，小款代誌。美國前總統川普打出「曲速行動」（Operation Warp Speed），投下上百億美金，通過衛生與公共服務部、國防部合作，資助多家藥廠研發疫苖，才有今天的成效。 至於說總統以下都成為「高端大使」，又怎樣？有問題嗎？過去國民黨一黨執政時，震天價響的口號不是「愛用國貨」嗎？現在民進黨執政，一改嘴臉，諷刺為「國貨」宣傳！恨恨恨呀。不可笑嗎？ 打高端是不是代表愛台灣？朱立倫說不是。高端六輪的施打率八六․五三％，中央疫情指揮官陳時中說，比ＡＺ、莫德納疫苗報到率九成略低，但不算低太多。此結果自與藍營一再炒作的唱衰不符，或許這是使朱立倫做出此一斷語的原因。 然而且先看幾個反例，再回頭檢視朱立倫的說法。最典型的話出於連勝文之口：「請民進黨民代和側翼盡快打高端，實踐台灣價值。」言下是「高端＝台灣價值」。這種心態模式同時見於洪秀柱、郁慕明、邱毅、苑舉正等人的言行，他們都把「打中國疫苗」等同「愛中國」。那麼朱立倫反其道而言，說「打高端不代表台灣價值」，是不是否證了洪秀柱等「打中國疫苗」代表「愛中國」的宣告？還是洪秀柱們的邏輯打了朱立倫邏輯的臉？ 國民黨這種邏輯上的錯亂，其實不只在愛／恨高端上，而在愛／不愛中國以及愛／不愛台灣上。國民黨的路怎麼這麼難走？看他們對高端的愛恨情仇就知道了。 （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）