朱立倫「每天搞統獨，好奇怪喔」！

自由廣場》（金恆煒專欄） 朱立倫「每天搞統獨，好奇怪喔」！ 2021/10/07 05:30 朱立倫是國民黨新科「最弱勢黨主席」，「朱弱弱」的帽子戴定了。最新民調，國民黨政黨支持度遠落於民進黨之後，不及二成，快要被民眾黨超車了；這是大趨勢。「朱弱弱」帶領一幫老弱殘兵，奔向黑漆漆沒有光明的未來，連藍色媒體人如蔡詩萍之流都指出國民黨「大宅門」的兩個心態：一是不正視台灣這塊選票來源的土地；二是不思索中共的威脅。如果「自己人」都看到無救的「命門」，朱立倫黨主席做個鳥？ 前主席江啟臣全力推動公投四案及罷免陳柏惟案，主要着眼點在黨主席選舉，藉此凝聚深藍選票，千算萬算不如老天一算，因為疫情全槓龜。朱立倫勉強打敗張亞中，取得大位，江主席的「罷惟案」遂不得不由朱概括承受。 「罷惟案」是朱立倫的第一戰，國民黨卯足全力，連TVBS的民調都應時出爐，四日民調，同意罷免的有五二點一％。TVBS民調可信嗎？在國民黨主席選舉的關鍵點，TVBS丟出：「張亞中支持度躍居第一」的民調，明顯失準。好罷，用民意如流水或可當遁詞，但十月四日TVBS竟用網友到宮廟的籤詩指出陳柏惟GG了；「網友」新聞可當依據？搞笑！以怪力亂神來證成自己的民調？下作！ 「罷惟」一案，朱立倫完全沒有進入情況。他十月二日抨擊陳柏惟「每天搞統獨，好奇怪喔！」然而「刪Q總部」罷免陳柏惟「四大理由」中剔除統獨議題，領銜人楊文元在記者會強調：「罷免陳柏惟行動，沒有統獨、藍綠之分。」盤點一下，每天搞統獨的不正是朱立倫自己嗎？從選上黨主席之後到十月二日抨擊陳，「每天搞統獨」的紀錄如下： ◆九月廿六日拜票，宣稱習大大賀電是「國家謀統一」，他的回覆是「九二共識、反台獨」。這不是搞統獨是搞什麼？ ◆九月廿七日，批蔡英文用「反中抗中獲取自己政治利益」。這不是搞統獨是搞什麼？ ◆九月廿八日，指蔡英文昔稱「一中是台灣民眾唯一選擇」。這不是搞統獨是搞什麼？ ◆九月廿九日，公開承認習大大的賀電與朱弱弱的回覆，一來一回是「共同決定」。這不是搞統獨是什麼？ ◆九月三十日，朱立倫「批民進黨只想破壞兩岸」。這不是搞統獨是搞什麼？ ◆十月一日，面對中國打壓台灣自由潛水選手參加的世界錦標賽，朱立倫反批蔡政府「無能與對岸保持對等尊嚴的來往」。這不是搞統獨搞什麼？ 正是因為國民黨朱立倫一貫唱和中國，才會有陳柏惟們的反制！洪秀柱喊「兩岸統一」，朱立倫說：這是言論自由。原來「搞統」是言論自由，「喊獨」要罷免。《印度時報》記者魯德羅內爾．戈什（Rudroneel Ghosh）批判朱立倫是「勾結敵人」；「勾結敵人」的人竟要罷免「抨擊敵人」的人，「好奇怪喔」！（作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

Putting out the ‘red unification’ fire

Home Editorials Thu, Oct 07, 2021 page8 Putting out the ‘red unification’ fire By Chin Heng-wei 金恒煒 The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) elected a new chairperson on Sept. 25, with Eric Chu (朱立倫) winning the race to succeed Johnny Chiang (江啟臣). While the election was contested vociferously, hardly any Taiwanese from outside the party took notice. This is because the internal machinations of the KMT are of little consequence to Taiwan: It matters not who won. The latest edition of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, released in February, saw Taiwan move up 20 notches to place 11th globally, joining the ranks of full democracies. Public participation in political decisionmaking in Taiwan shows that democracy has replaced authoritarianism in a strong rebuke to China’s dictatorship. Taiwan’s anti-China sentiment stems from the public’s firm belief in civil values and the power of democracy. Taiwanese view democracy as their destiny. However, the KMT is unable to extricate itself from its “unification” straitjacket, which has caused democratic Taiwan’s trust in the party to go into free-fall. The KMT’s chairperson election was a four-way race between Chiang, Chu, former Changhua County commissioner Cho Po-yuan (卓伯源) and Sun Yat-sen School president Chang Ya-chung (張亞中). Chang was the most prominent individual in the race, and was accused by Chu of being a “red unification” — a position close to that of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — candidate, burnishing Chang’s credentials as the party’s gold-plated pro-China candidate. Chang therefore performed a useful function as a barometer for pro-unification sentiment within the KMT. Chang gained approximately 30 percent of the total vote, while the ostensibly anti-unification candidates received 70 percent between them. Nevertheless, Chu was reportedly taken aback by Chang’s rapid rise and strong performance. Both the voter turnout rate of 50.71 percent and Chu’s 45 percent share of the votes were record lows for KMT chairperson election, a sign of the party’s shrinking fortunes. Chu’s victory turned out to be expensive for the party, as it essentially “saved” Chu rather than Chu saving the party. In other words, the problem facing the KMT is that on one hand, it relies on “red unification” to sustain its position, while on the other, it vigorously resists the “red unification” faction to prevent it from taking control of the party and dragging it onto the rocks. During the election campaign, Chu unequivocally vilified the “red unification” faction, yet now that he has been elected, he will be unable to escape their influence. The KMT’s deep-seated structural problem is now Chu’s problem. Chang ostentatiously flew the flag for unification with China when he announced his bid for the chairpersonship: It was a calculated plan. To say that the KMT is long in the tooth would be an understatement: 70 percent of its members are older than 65, while the majority of its members are waishengren (外省人) — Chinese who came to Taiwan with the Nationalist government after World War II — or retired military members, civil servants and teachers. Chang gained 60,632 votes compared with Chu’s 85,164. However, a breakdown of the vote shows that Chang lost to Chu by just more than 200 votes in Taipei. In Kaohsiung’s Zuoying (左營) and Fongshan (鳳山) districts, where a large number of military veterans live, Chang received more votes than Chu. In other words, Chang had the unification vote sewn up. Since Chu dared criticize Chang about his unification stance, it is unsurprising that Chang hoovered up this section of the KMT’s voter base. This also means that Chu is now starting out as the weakest chairperson in the party’s history. As Chu has thoroughly alienated the unification voter base, if he wants to win an election, he must lance the unification boil and steer the KMT toward becoming a normal political party. However, the situation is not so simple. Chu is a fervent admirer of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and appears to view Xi’s congratulatory telegram as an imperial edict. Chu’s sycophantic reply reads like a total capitulation to the pro-unification camp. This is perhaps why former KMT legislator Chiu Yi (邱毅), commenting on the election result, said that Chang had not lost, and attaining the second-highest vote tally shows that popular sentiment within the party is on Chang’s side. Chu used his victory speech at the KMT party headquarters to shamelessly boast that “it is time for the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] to start worrying,” following this up with “because the KMT will overflow with fighting spirit and unity.” This is the important point: Now that Chu has taken over the reins, his most urgent goal is not to fight the DPP, but to put out the “red unification” fire. The combative, deep-blue KMT member Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康) has called for “unity, unity and more unity,” the most prominent member of the KMT aristocracy, New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜), has called on New Party members to “refocus on unity,” and National Sun Yat-sen University professor Liao Da-chi (廖達琪), a pan-blue camp academic, has said that Chu should “handle internal problems first before tackling external threats.” In other words, a weak Chu does not need to worry about the DPP; he should be concerned with internal “unity” by party hardliners. In an opinion piece published on Sept. 26 in the Chinese-language United Daily News, Huang Nien (黃年) wrote that Chang’s success might trigger a “catfish effect” — when a strong competitor causes a weaker competitor to better themselves, while Yang Tai-shun (楊泰順), also in the United Daily News, wrote about “The Chang whirlwind effect’s transformative direction.” All of these voices are attempting to do the same thing: force Chu to give in to the unification camp. In the Chinese novel Dream of the Red Chamber (紅樓夢), there is a passage that reads: “If the easterly wind does not overwhelm the westerly wind, then the westerly wind will overwhelm the easterly wind.” With the elections over, Chang and his supporters will overwhelm Chu, and Chu will not be able to stop them from bringing the KMT further down the road to “red unification.” Chin Heng-wei is a political commentator. Translated by Edward Jones

朱立倫斬不斷的「紅統」不歸路

自由廣場》（金恒煒專欄） 2021/09/30 05:30 國民黨黨主席選舉外冷內熱，原因很簡單，誰上誰下對台灣毫無影響。英國《經濟學人》智庫（EIU）今年的「全球民主指數」，台灣高居全球第十一，駸然進入「全民主國家」之林。台灣人在政治決定上的高度，代表「民主」壓倒「專制」，從而標誌出以「民主台灣」反斥 「專制中國」的必然；「反中」在於文明價值，在於台灣人的民主信念，這是使命。國民黨無法跳出「紅統」，注定喪失民主台灣的多數信任。 國民黨四人參選，張亞中勢必成為指標人物，朱立倫當面指控他是「紅統」，顯見他的「成色」十足。張亞中的重要性就是提供了探測國民黨「紅統」的統計資料；黨內初選「紅統」盡出，張亞中只拿到三成選票，不挺「紅統」的七成；然而依然嚇破朱立倫的膽，沒出息。 國民黨黨主席選舉的投票率與當選率雙雙創下新低，這代表一種萎縮。朱立倫是在「全黨救一人」下慘勝。換句話說，國民黨面臨的困局就是一方面靠「紅統」支撐場面，一方面力抗「紅統」掌控全黨而導至「毀黨」。朱立倫赤裸裸詆毀「紅統」，選上了卻跳不出「紅統」；國民黨深層結構的困局就是朱立倫的困局。 張亞中大張旗鼓打出「紅統」跳入戰局，其實是有計算的。根據報導，國民黨黨員的結構極度老化，六十五歲以上黨員佔七成，大多以外省、退休軍公教為主，四十歲以下的黨員僅佔三成。張亞中拿下六萬多票，朱立倫八萬多票；但張亞中在台北市只輸朱立倫二百多票，高雄左營與鳳山兩個軍眷區的得票超過朱立倫。張亞中所恃就是「紅統」。 朱立倫敢於面斥張亞中「紅統」，不料票開出來，紅通通一片，最後落得「最弱勢」主席的慘狀。按照朱老將痛貶「紅統」 的姿態，勝出勢必一刀割斷「紅統」，讓國民黨走上正常政黨之路。然而不然。朱立倫巴巴仰望中國習大大的青眼，拿到賀信宛如聖旨，他的回信正是向「紅統」低頭的表態。這就是為什麼邱毅會說張亞中沒有輸、為什麼張亞中認為自己能獲第二高選票是出於「民心」的原因。 朱立倫選後到中央黨部講話，大言不慚的宣告「民進黨從今天開始擔心」，下一句話就洩了底，「因為國民黨會充滿戰鬥力與團結」。重點來了。朱立倫坐上寶座的燃眉之急不是民進黨，而是紅統「散伙」。「戰鬥藍」的趙少康呼喊「團結、團結、再團結」，國民黨最大諸侯新北市長侯友宜呼籲「回歸團結」，藍色學者廖達琪說「先安內再攘外」。所以弱勢朱要擔心的不是民進黨，而是內部「團結」。《聯合報》無論黃年拈出的「張亞中鯰魚效應」或楊泰順提出的「張亞中旋風的改造方向」，在在逼迫朱立倫向「紅統」低頭 。 《紅樓夢》說：「不是東風壓倒西風，就是西風壓倒東風。」選完之後，張亞中壓倒朱立倫，朱立倫鐵定斬不斷「紅統」這條不歸路。 （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

）警方─檢方─法院已成為一條惡龍

自由廣場》（金恒煒專欄）警方─檢方─法院已成為一條惡龍 2021/09/23 05:30 賣成衣的朱學恒送喪禮花籃到衛福部疾管局、到駐德大使館，部長陳時中與大使謝志偉並沒有提告，警方、檢方也沒有任何行動；陳時中只說台灣是「法治國」，謝志偉則把所送花朵插到廁所，諷之為「垃圾回收」。與成衣商的喪禮花籃相比，喪葬業／卡拉OＫ朱姓商人僱喪葬團歡送警察局分局長，竟被拘提、被送辦、被羈押，兩朱的際遇天壤之別。朱姓成衣商與朱姓喪葬業者所作所為完全一致，為什麼後果天差地別？是法律出了問題還是司法出了問題？ 新竹縣警察局竹東分局局長江建忠調派宜蘭三星警分局，十五日下午縣民朱氏僱用送葬團的白色醒獅和佛祖車「歡送」、「祝賀」，據報導引發警界高層「震怒」，警方拘提朱男到案。十六日警政署長陳家欽到新竹先把朱男的行為定為「侮辱公署」，又將之與黑道掛在一起，表示：「對於不法分子挑戰公權力，絕對不會坐視不管，已指示刑事局追查揪出幕後指使者嚴辦。」 「侮辱公署」其實是「微罪」，不過「三千元以下罰金」而已，當然構不成「聲押」的要件，據報導，有法界人士認為這些人太囂張，已踩到司法機關的「紅線」，於是棄「侮辱公署罪」，改採有「串證之虞」的刑事訴訟法第一○一條聲押，最後法官竟率而裁准了。從拘提到聲押到獲准一氣呵成，老實說侵犯人權到無以復加的地步，警方到檢方到法院，非法濫權到絲絲入扣，一椿小小的案子大大暴露了台灣司法的黑暗。 警方拘提朱姓男子祭出的是所謂「侮辱公署罪」，這個法條藏在刑法一四一條「妨害公務」下的末尾，明顯有違憲之虞；如果堪用，朱成衣商早就法辦了。何況「公署」不是「官衙」，憲法保護言論自由，公民挑戰「公署」之權不容剝奪。美國歷史上有Sedition Act of 1918，明文禁止污辱憲法、三軍、聯邦、總統等，與台灣現在的「侮辱公署罪」無異，美國國會一九二○年廢除此條款。台灣殘留的此一戒嚴尾巴，難道國會還要坐視？ 陳家欽說「我們尊嚴掃地！」那麼法辦朱姓男子到底是為了「面子」還是「法律」？檢察官知道「侮辱公署罪」不符合羈押要件，臨時改換法條，動用「串供」的刑法，不啻是為羈押而羈押的故入人罪；濫用羈押手段等於顛覆無罪推論的帝王原則，那就是濫權。用羈押當手段壓迫被告，那是刑法學者林山田過去一再揭示的濫權擴張，不料復見於今日。重點是，羈押必須符合「合法的目的」，也必須符合「比例原則」。警方為了「面子」，非要繫朱於獄，安上「黑道」罪名形同「一清專案」故伎；太可恥了罷！那是黨國的心態復辟，民主的台灣能容許嗎？ 警方─檢方─法院已成為一條惡龍，吞噬無權無勢的小民，「是可忍也，孰不可忍」？ （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

趙少康討打

由廣場》（金恒煒專欄） 2021/09/16 05:30 中廣公司董事長、ＴＶＢＳ談話節目主持人趙少康大張旗鼓成立「戰鬥藍」，要進軍二○二二年選舉。咚咚戰鼓終於讓前澄社社長、前立委黃國昌看不下去，拋出「戰帖」挑戰，指控趙跨越了媒體與政治應有的紅線：「一位掌握媒體大權的第一線媒體人，能夠這樣毫無分際地發起政黨次團體、站在第一線領導政治攻防嗎？」 黃國昌措辭強悍，直攻核心，趙少康沒有絲毫閃避的空間，硬著頭皮逼得出面回應；可憐，荒腔走板到像不識之無的痴憨小兒。他的答辯有兩大重點，其一是說「現行〈廣電法〉只規定媒體人不能參加黨職、公職」云云。大錯特錯。〈廣電法〉管不到「媒體人」，自沒有任何「規定媒體人不能……」；〈廣電法〉的規範對象是「政府、政黨、其捐助成立之財團法人及其受託人」，趙少康紮了一個稻草人來當盾牌反問：「有規定媒體人不能有政治立場、不能有政治主張、不能參加政治活動嗎？」只透露自己缺乏起碼的法律ＡＢＣ知識。 趙少康的第二個答辯是，他「沒有黨職也沒有公職身份，且『戰鬥藍』也不是政治團體、政黨，為什麼要辭職？」此地含有三個問題，最關鍵的是「戰鬥藍」是不是政治團體？很容易反駁，你看到一隻鴨子，走起來像鴨子、叫起來像鴨子、吃起來像鴨子，那就是鴨子。趙少康號召從政黨員：「明年選舉只要喊『戰鬥藍』，就一定當選！」請問，「戰鬥藍」不是「政治團體」又是什麼東西！趙少康已回復黨籍，且「戰鬥藍」成員不是黨籍立委就是黨籍議員，幾乎沒有例外，「戰鬥藍」就是為選舉，全屬政黨活動，更何況請假中的黨主席江啟臣還花大錢替「戰鬥藍」做半版廣告。這不是黨務工作是什麼？ 〈廣電法〉第五條各項各款規定，趙少康幾乎無一不違犯；尤其禁止政黨、政黨黨務工作人員等「擔任廣播、電視事業之發起人、董事、監察人及經理人。」僅這一條，趙少康就非得辭中廣公司董事長不可，還需要黃國昌指點「為什麼要辭？」辭了中廣董事長只擔任ＴＶＢＳ談話節目，如果還利用媒體為「戰鬥藍」張目，這是藉媒體謀一己政治權力，對黨內或政黨間都有失「公平競爭」原則；〈廣電法〉固不及媒體人，但ＮＣＣ既能停「中天」，難道不能治ＴＶＢＳ？「中天」因韓國瑜而亡，ＴＶＢＳ要把生死押在趙少康身上？ 趙少康自己踩了紅線，還東拉西扯的說：「除了ＴＶＢＳ中立外，幾乎都成了親綠媒體」。ＴＶＢＳ「中立」嗎？這是簡單可以回答的問題。任何辯論一方，一旦祭出「中立」二字，其實就洩了自己的底。最好笑的是趙少康把「三民自」當成「三明治」來打，顯示這位媒體大亨只是生意人，不知道電視、廣播之所以有法律規範，是因為稀有性，不能挪用於平面媒體；把「三民」、「自」綁在一起，好像把油與酒混在同一瓶子一樣荒唐。 黃國昌要趙少康來一次面對面辯論，趙少康不敢接招，原因就那麼簡單。 （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

有了「戰鬥藍」還須要「黨中央」？

自由廣場》（金恒煒專欄）有了「戰鬥藍」還須要「黨中央」？ 2021/09/09 05:30 國民黨黨主席選舉，很冷；與韓國瑜叱吒一時的現象比較，落差未免太大。更值得關注的是，台上江啟臣、朱立倫、張亞中、卓伯源四人辯論，竟抵不過台下趙少康一人的吆喝；不是趙少康有多厲害，是「四人幫」氣息奄奄到瀕死狀態。 國民黨走到今天，真是途窮日暮，全黨沒有一個超人氣，候選人中沒有一個是行政首長，江啟臣是立委外，其他三人一介平民而已；江啟臣雖是國會議員，看來也不能號召黨籍立委。國民黨的運氣可能被韓國瑜梭哈完了，大賭一把下，輸光了國民黨的全部家當。落到今天地步，不知算不算老天有眼？還是台灣人民「贊」!? 趙少康原本要競逐黨主席，而且拿出韓國瑜的「令箭」，不料被黨中央堵截而功敗垂成。現在重新練兵，組成「戰鬥藍」，其一決藍天之氣勢，看來遠比台上四諸公強。那麼，趙少康到底要幹什麼？必有所圖是大家的共見，問題是，所為何事？ 媒體最先的報導是，趙少康要分裂黨、分裂藍營，自成新勢力。此推論來自趙少康有「分裂黨」的多次前科，第一次是在黨內搞「新國民黨連線」， 一九九三年成立新黨，角逐台北市長，與國民黨提名的黃大洲搶票不遂，新黨的風光很短時間就黯然收斂。趙少康對自己的歷史問題的回應是：李登輝要搞台獨，所以「分裂」有理。其實問題的關鍵在李登輝的高人氣下，只能選擇「離開」一途；盱衡實力，李登輝宛如大樹，要掰倒李主席是不可能的任務，只能落入「蚍蜉撼大樹」的慘境。這回成立「戰鬥藍」，強調不是分裂黨，而是「希望國民黨整個變成有機的戰鬥體」。這句話才是重點。 也有媒體說他要變成「地下黨主席」，問題是，有能力成為「地下黨主席」，早就下手了，要等到現在？何況能不能成為「地下」的權臣，像張居正一樣，也得看萬曆皇帝的能耐。但是，經過黨主席艱苦的選戰，好不容易取得黨主席權柄，臥榻之旁豈容他人酣睡？ 既不是「分裂」出去，又不能當「地下黨主席」，趙少康要幹什麼？能幹什麼？看他虎虎生風的南北奔波、串連，又是議員，又是立委，其實志在「另立黨中央」；這個黨中央不是制度性的，更像是吸星大法般吸納國民黨 / 藍營於「戰鬥藍」的有機體中，即使黨中央依然在，即使黨主席依然在，透過排擠效用，黨不免只剩空殼子。戰鬥藍的力道一旦壓過黨中央，趙少康就立地成王了。 看趙少康的號召就知道他的戰略，大言炎炎的說：「明年選舉只要喊『戰鬥藍』，就一定當選！」像不像中共文革的神話：「戰無不勝，攻無不克的毛澤東思想萬歲！萬歲！萬萬歲！」有了「戰鬥藍」神威的護體，誰須要黨中央!?何況「戰鬥藍」的象徵符號也設計好了，就是打上顯赫「戰鬥藍」標誌的口罩；這是制服，像中山裝一樣。 國民黨一邊是黨主席選舉，一邊是「戰鬥藍」開打，兩條路線，最後會不會綰結在一起？誰主浮沉？這是看點。 （作者金恒煒為政治評論者；http://wenichin.blogspot.tw/）

KMT hopefuls’ focus on deep blue By Chin Heng-wei 金恒煒 Are the candidates in the upcoming Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairperson election simply vying for the party leadership or is it about preparing for the grand prize of the presidency in 2024? According to political logic and the rules of power play, the election for the top job in a political party is to muster the troops for major elections, with the objective of selecting the presidential candidate or primary political power brokers, thereby gaining control over the executive and legislative branches. The KMT has done away with the formula of 30 percent party member votes and 70 percent public opinion polls in the chairperson primary in favor of looking solely at opinion polls, so that it is best placed for gaining the ultimate prize in 2024. However, the two main candidates have clearly set their sights firmly and exclusively on the deep-blue vote within the party, and seem to be unconcerned about votes coming from anywhere else. One needs look no further than how they staged their official registration for the election. Former New Taipei City mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫) made sure he arrived at 10:10am on the dot, a clear reference to Oct. 10, Double Ten National Day, and was flanked by representatives of the Retrocession Alliance formed of members of the KMT’s deep-blue Huang Fu-hsing (黃復興) faction, including retired generals such as former army commander-in-chief Chen Chen-hsiang (陳鎮湘), Central Military Institute and Academy Alumni Association president Chi Lin-liang (季麟連) and Fu Hsing Kang Alumni Foundation president Lee Tien-tuo (李天鐸). Not to be outdone, KMT Chairman Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) amassed a veritable constellation of his own, as he was accompanied by representatives from the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy, the Political Warfare Cadres Academy, also known as Fu Hsing Kang College, and the National Defense Medical Center. Who exactly were these people? They are hardly household names. None has a sufficiently high national profile to attract votes, and therein lies the rub: The presence of these “heavyweights” will hold no sway beyond military dependents’ villages or the deep-blue vote. Thus, it revealed Chiang’s and Chu’s modest expectations: Their ambition stops at securing the KMT leadership. The party loves to dangle numbers before Taiwanese’s eyes, as evidenced in Chu’s reference to Double Ten National Day and the “seven major policy initiatives,” and Chu’s “five major goals” and “five major promises” if he wins re-election. Of course, there is also Chu’s “823 Artillery Bombardment,” which he claimed for the KMT, saying that it represented how the party defended Taiwan in 1958. He was simply repeating the KMT’s lie about the bombardment of Kinmen and Matsu, which was a farce contrived by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT. As former Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai (周恩來) told former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger: In 1958, then-US secretary of state John Foster Dulles wanted then-president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) to abandon Kinmen and Matsu to completely sever relations between Taiwan and China, but Chiang Kai-shek refused to do so, due in part to Zhou advising him not to withdraw his troops. The truth is that the bombardment was a sham, an act of cooperation between the CCP and the KMT. Zhou himself used the word “cooperation.” If this is the case, how can what happened be seen as the KMT defending Taiwan? Even more risible are Chu’s comments that not one person from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) spilled their blood in the defense of Taiwan. To this I would ask, has Broadcasting Corp of China chairman Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康) ever spilled one drop of his blood defending Taiwan, or spent a day in jail for his political convictions? Has Chu? Has Johnny Chiang? Who exactly is Johnny Chiang trying to kid with his new slogan: “the 1992 consensus based on the Republic of China Constitution”? He has proposed two versions of this slogan in Chinese, but however he phrases it, marrying the corpse that is the Constitution with the lie that is the “1992 consensus” simply does not get Taiwan very far. In February, just after he became KMT chairman, Johnny Chiang was fully prepared, without a second’s hesitation, to bid farewell to the “1992 consensus,” saying that it is outdated, lacks flexibility and is gradually losing the support of Taiwanese. He also said that he himself was a young man of only 20 years when the “consensus” was made, and that “irrespective of whatever ‘consensus’ the two sides of the Taiwan Strait arrived at back then, friends younger than myself need to feel that this ‘consensus’ in some way represents them.” Not even half a year later, with those words still ringing in people’s ears, he has retrieved the discarded concept from the trashcan of history and held it aloft as some kind of rediscovered treasure. The reason he has done so is simple: He wants to use its tarnished allure to secure the deep-blue vote; he wants his slice of former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) support. After all, as the appetite for the chairperson election has all but dissipated, he needs all the votes he can get, by hook or by crook. He might well find that his new slogan will come back and bite him in the behind. Truly, the two main KMT chairperson candidates have their mouths full of lies and heads full of cheese. Chin Heng-wei is a political commentator. Translated by Paul Cooper

KMT hopefuls’ focus on deep blue By Chin Heng-wei 金恒煒 Are the candidates in the upcoming Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairperson election simply vying for the party leadership or is it about preparing for the grand prize of the presidency in 2024? According to political logic and the rules of power play, the election for the top job in a political party is to muster the troops for major elections, with the objective of selecting the presidential candidate or primary political power brokers, thereby gaining control over the executive and legislative branches. The KMT has done away with the formula of 30 percent party member votes and 70 percent public opinion polls in the chairperson primary in favor of looking solely at opinion polls, so that it is best placed for gaining the ultimate prize in 2024. However, the two main candidates have clearly set their sights firmly and exclusively on the deep-blue vote within the party, and seem to be unconcerned about votes coming from anywhere else. One needs look no further than how they staged their official registration for the election. Former New Taipei City mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫) made sure he arrived at 10:10am on the dot, a clear reference to Oct. 10, Double Ten National Day, and was flanked by representatives of the Retrocession Alliance formed of members of the KMT’s deep-blue Huang Fu-hsing (黃復興) faction, including retired generals such as former army commander-in-chief Chen Chen-hsiang (陳鎮湘), Central Military Institute and Academy Alumni Association president Chi Lin-liang (季麟連) and Fu Hsing Kang Alumni Foundation president Lee Tien-tuo (李天鐸). Not to be outdone, KMT Chairman Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) amassed a veritable constellation of his own, as he was accompanied by representatives from the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy, the Political Warfare Cadres Academy, also known as Fu Hsing Kang College, and the National Defense Medical Center. Who exactly were these people? They are hardly household names. None has a sufficiently high national profile to attract votes, and therein lies the rub: The presence of these “heavyweights” will hold no sway beyond military dependents’ villages or the deep-blue vote. Thus, it revealed Chiang’s and Chu’s modest expectations: Their ambition stops at securing the KMT leadership. The party loves to dangle numbers before Taiwanese’s eyes, as evidenced in Chu’s reference to Double Ten National Day and the “seven major policy initiatives,” and Chu’s “five major goals” and “five major promises” if he wins re-election. Of course, there is also Chu’s “823 Artillery Bombardment,” which he claimed for the KMT, saying that it represented how the party defended Taiwan in 1958. He was simply repeating the KMT’s lie about the bombardment of Kinmen and Matsu, which was a farce contrived by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT. As former Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai (周恩來) told former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger: In 1958, then-US secretary of state John Foster Dulles wanted then-president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) to abandon Kinmen and Matsu to completely sever relations between Taiwan and China, but Chiang Kai-shek refused to do so, due in part to Zhou advising him not to withdraw his troops. The truth is that the bombardment was a sham, an act of cooperation between the CCP and the KMT. Zhou himself used the word “cooperation.” If this is the case, how can what happened be seen as the KMT defending Taiwan? Even more risible are Chu’s comments that not one person from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) spilled their blood in the defense of Taiwan. To this I would ask, has Broadcasting Corp of China chairman Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康) ever spilled one drop of his blood defending Taiwan, or spent a day in jail for his political convictions? Has Chu? Has Johnny Chiang? Who exactly is Johnny Chiang trying to kid with his new slogan: “the 1992 consensus based on the Republic of China Constitution”? He has proposed two versions of this slogan in Chinese, but however he phrases it, marrying the corpse that is the Constitution with the lie that is the “1992 consensus” simply does not get Taiwan very far. In February, just after he became KMT chairman, Johnny Chiang was fully prepared, without a second’s hesitation, to bid farewell to the “1992 consensus,” saying that it is outdated, lacks flexibility and is gradually losing the support of Taiwanese. He also said that he himself was a young man of only 20 years when the “consensus” was made, and that “irrespective of whatever ‘consensus’ the two sides of the Taiwan Strait arrived at back then, friends younger than myself need to feel that this ‘consensus’ in some way represents them.” Not even half a year later, with those words still ringing in people’s ears, he has retrieved the discarded concept from the trashcan of history and held it aloft as some kind of rediscovered treasure. The reason he has done so is simple: He wants to use its tarnished allure to secure the deep-blue vote; he wants his slice of former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) support. After all, as the appetite for the chairperson election has all but dissipated, he needs all the votes he can get, by hook or by crook. He might well find that his new slogan will come back and bite him in the behind. Truly, the two main KMT chairperson candidates have their mouths full of lies and heads full of cheese. Chin Heng-wei is a political commentator. Translated by Paul Cooper